In the North Caucasus there are leaders who can rectify the situation
The problem of the North Caucasus goes to every president of post-Soviet Russia as a sum of mutually exclusive and simultaneously interrelated tasks, which tangle more and more from one president to another. With necessary ritual declaration by each new master of the Kremlin of the desire to bring the situation in the region to all-Russian level somehow everything turns out quite the contrary.
Separation of one more administrative unit - the North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO) - should be seen as an attempt of the third president of Russia to solve this problem. To solve, judging by the figure of head of the new district, through purely economic and administrative measures. If possible, not resorting to "traditional recipes", which consisted mainly of a wide range of power tools, slightly diluted with financial injections. In this case, without due attention remained the fact that power tools fell to the share of the civil society itself, which the federal center should have fetched over, but finances were distributed in such a devious way that all those who participated in their disbursement, proved to be interested in maintaining the situation of "no peace - no war" that they started to rectify.
The establishment of a new district was preceded by eloquent rhetoric of the President of Russia, in which he described the main causes of instability in the North Caucasus. These included, among others, clans system and corruption of local authorities. The corruption, according to Medvedev, has reached "horrific scale".
At that, not a single word has been said that the situation in the Caucasus is nothing more than a consequence of the disease of Russia's power in general. The disease, which has assumed in the North Caucasus, according to local conditions, the most dangerous character. Similarly, as furunculosis is a consequence of the disease of circulatory system. But in this case the doctors do not try to make up ulcers and report that the disease is conquered, as we have seen in the actions of the Kremlin in recent years in relation to the situation in the Caucasus.
If at the beginning of this century we spoke only of Chechen separatism and Chechen terrorism, then today we are talking about the spread of this phenomenon throughout the entire Caucasus and other regions of Russia, densely populated with Muslim majority. Having once staked on the former separatists in the region, the power gained tactical advantage. But, turning a short-term stake into the long-term project, it made a strategic mistake.
Therefore, natural is the desire of the third president to build a new administrative structure, to the activities of which the former performers will have quite indirect relation and under the cover of which one will be able to start settling the situation in real earnest. The fact that this is the point unwittingly confirmed Ramzan Kadyrov, in a recent interview opposing the establishment of a new district: "Why do we need one more intermediate?".
Naturally, today has been unfolded not very noticeable, but serious apparat war for the right to fill the new administration with staff. The blowing up in the press of rumors that the post of head of the new district would allegedly take either Kadyrov, or recently dismissed from his post as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Yedelev, who oversaw the work of the agency in the South Federal District, should be viewed as echoes of this struggle.
The main task of a newly-elected head of the new district is now the selection of personnel, not related to the former bureaucratic apparatus of the SFD. All the work of which was based solely on the fact that the least possible information about the true situation in the region became public domain. At the same time there is no less difficult task of identifying and placing in the apparatus of those who really can help to resolve the situation.
By many components the Chechen Republic is an object that will call for the greatest attention from the new administration. And when Mr. Khloponin begins to explore the origins of the conflict in order to determine whom to rely on and whom to invite into his apparatus, will open amazing things.
First, it will turn out that the vast majority of the Chechen people absolutely do not share and did not share the ideas of separatism. And this is documented. Then naturally the question arises: how do you explain two bloody wars on this land? Against whom did they fight and whom believed the enemy, if the separatists were a tiny minority?
Secondly, it will turn out that this pro-government majority has its leaders. Those, whom the Kremlin's favorite in the 2003 presidential elections, Kadyrov senior significantly dropped behind. Along the way, it will turn out that neither of them - not just leaders, but even the ranks, who at one time opposed to Dudayev's separatist policy, - are in neither the lists of the executive power of the current republic, nor among the deputies.
Most interesting is that they have become leaders only because they were the bearers of the idea, shared by a majority of Chechen society. That is, opponents of separatism. While the Kremlin's favorite represented the opposite camp.
In principle, the mission of Khloponin, on closer examination, does not seem an obvious failure, as some analysts try to present. The new envoy has people to rely on in the region. It is very important that he does not need to seek or create new leaders. They are quite capable, have influence in large parts of society and established a good reputation in opposition to the separatists before the first Chechen war. Chechnya is obliged to them for the fact that in the first war of 440 settlements of the republic in some extent only 19 were destroyed. That is, were saved thousands of lives. Not for nothing that the separatists in absentia announced them "enemies of the people" and sentenced to death. So this is the strategic reserve of Khloponin. But rectifying the situation in Chechnya automatically entails improved situation throughout the Caucasus.
Do not forget that, by virtue of certain circumstances, the Caucasus cannot be measured as "depressed region in Russia's province", which should be pulled up to the overall level with purely economic levers. First, there should work ideology. The ideology, supported and shared by the majority. Only when the carriers of this ideology come into power and shape regional policy, then will work the economic levers. In any other case, we may assume that the mission is impossible, and say goodbye to the Caucasus.
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